Ordering Knowledge by Methodical Doubt: Francis Bacon's Constructive Scepticism by Montuschi, Eleonora
1 
 
ISSN 2045-5577 
   ORDER:  GOD’S, MAN’S AND NATURE’S 
 
 
Ordering Knowledge by Methodical Doubt: Francis Bacon's Constructive 
Scepticism 
 
Eleonora Montuschi 
 
 
Methodical doubt is usually associated with Descartes. However, it is with Francis 
Bacon that its function and scope are first recognized – as a preliminary stage in the 
attainment of knowledge, and as an epistemological tool (a rule) for achieving true 
knowledge. In this paper, I follow the various steps of construction and use of 
Baconian doubt as it appears in the first book of the New Organon. I will argue that 
Bacon - in distancing himself from traditional scepticism – will come to conceive 
methodical doubt not only as a procedure for renovating knowledge, but more 
specifically as a prescriptive condition for identifying what 'mind' is required to pursue 
the aim of renovating knowledge. 
 
 
1. The new idea of scientific method 
The model for methodical procedure from Aristotle to Descartes, was demonstration.1 
In a demonstration a conclusion proceeds from premises by means of deductive 
rules of inference. The truth of the premises can be given, as in Aristotle, by 'intuition' 
(epagogé); and the truth of the conclusion derives by necessity (deductive inference) 
from the truth of the premises. 
It is this conception of method, which had dominated scientific knowledge for almost 
two thousand years, that Bacon and the nascent experimental tradition of the 
seventeenth century made the target of their fiercest criticism. The new 
methodologists retained the view that a good method must make use of a compelling 
technique for assessing truth. They also agreed that nothing was more compelling 
than logic. Where they disagreed with deductive methodologists was how and where 
to look for truth, and consequently what kind of logic was best suited to achieve truth. 
                                                 
1 For the various models of scientific method see McMullin,E., 'The Social 
Dimension of Science', in E.McMullin (ed.), The Social Dimension of Science, 
Notre Dame University Press, Notre Dame 1992; and also McMullin,E., The 
Inference That Makes Science, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee 1992.  
 
2 
 
Truth could not be given by intuition, according to the new methodologists: truth is 
something to be discovered. It cannot therefore appear in the premises of a 
demonstration (eg., in the form of an intuitive principle, or of an axiom). By being the 
goal of an inquiry, truth can only be the conclusion of a process of generalization 
from the particular. For this reason, they argued, the logical path to the discovery of 
truth can only be inductive. 
However, simple induction is inadequate: as Bacon reminds us in The New Organon, 
"the sense by itself is a thing infirm and erring." 2 Observation and experiments are to 
be guided by some rules, in order not to lead us astray.3 The new method must then 
rely on ‘true induction’, which Bacon describes as the only way towards "a true lawful 
and lasting marriage between the empirical and the rational faculties"  - a marriage 
that will restore science to its position of power and authority and will bring order to 
all the affairs of the human family. 
How do we know that Bacon's 'new organon' is the right method for achieving truth? 
How can we trust Bacon that his method will fulfill its promises? Bacon does not 
simply make his new method an object of faith. Rather, he undertakes a preparatory 
work that provides him with arguments and reasons in support of his new method. 
These arguments and reasons are not viewed as part of a demonstrative chain of 
reasoning. They are rather conceived as ‘provocative opinions’ addressed to an 
                                                 
2 Bacon, The New Organon, Bk.I, Aph.23; Spedding's ed. p.51. It has also 
been pointed out how the way in which Bacon identifies the idols of the mind 
has influenced the concept of 'ideology' proper of the Enlightenment, in 
particular the way in which this concept was usd to label those intellectual 
systems which served the interests of a group rather than serving truth per se. 
See for ex., Barth,H., Truth and Ideology (1976), Berkeley: University of 
California Press, pp.22-26. 
 
3  "the true method of experience on the contrary first light a candle, and then 
by means of the candle shows the way; commencing as it does with 
experience duly ordered and digested, not bungling or erratic, and from it 
educing axioms, and from established axioms again new experiments." 
Bacon, The New Organon, Bk.I, Aph.82; Spedding's ed. p.81. 
"the true method of experience on the contrary first light a candle, and then by 
means of the candle shows the way; commencing as it does with experience 
duly ordered and digested, not bungling or erratic, and from it educing axioms, 
and from established axioms again new experiments." Bacon, The New 
Organon, Bk.I, Aph.82; Spedding's ed. p.81. 
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audience: Bacon's aim is to convince his King and a new generation of scholars of 
the 'attractiveness' of his view.4  
Bacon's audience is not taken, however, at face value. For arguments to be effective 
– that is, persuasive – Bacon’s audience needs to be educated. In view of this, the 
preparatory work is conceived in terms of two joint tasks: old minds are 'cleaned', and 
a new mind is 'built up' in their place. The two tasks must be undertaken since, 
Bacon believes, the old mind might well become an obstacle for the new to take over: 
 
"For in a new matter, it is not only the strong preoccupation of some old opinion that 
tends to create a prejudice, but also a false preconception or prefiguration of the new 
thing which is presented. I will endevour therefore to impart sound and true opinions 
as to the things I propose, although they are to serve only for the time, and by way of 
interest (so to speak), till the thing itself, which is the principal, be fully known."5 
 
It is the joint pursuit of the two tasks of the preparatory work that sets the need for 
using methodical doubt: if we (the audience) are prepared to doubt old opinions and 
all the prejudices that inhabit our minds, we will be better disposed towards 
considering the possible virtues of the new method. Besides, if we (the audience) 
accept the challenge set by the method of doubt, Bacon is prepared to offer reasons 
('true and good opinions') that will make doubting a plausible procedure. Were we to 
accept these reasons, it will then become relatively easy to free ourselves from 
received opinions and prejudices. Finally, with a mind as clean as that of an innocent 
child, we will be able first to consider and then, hopefully, to accept the new method, 
as well as the new science that this method will, arguably, bring about: 
 
"the understanding [must be] thoroughly freed and cleansed; the entrance into the 
kingdom of man, founded on the sciences, being not much other than the entrance 
into the kingdom of heaven, whereinto none may enter except as a little child."6 
 
                                                 
4  The reason to address the King was to win his support; and the new 
generation of scholars had to be provided with effective reasons to fight the 
Aristotelians and their obsolete views.  
 
5 Bacon, The New Organon, Bk I, Aph.115; Spedding's ed. p.103. 
 
6 Ibidem, Aph.68; Spedding's ed. p.69. 
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It might be worth mentioning at this point (although I will return to this issue later) that 
Bacon's use of doubt appears from the start to be 'methodical' in at least two senses. 
The doubt is a prescriptive cure for the mind (first sense), and a condition for the 
adoption of the new method (second sense), as a cured mind will inevitably favour 
the new method. Therefore, prescribing the cure and adopting the new method are 
part and parcel of the very same strategy to achieve knowledge. 
Baconian doubt does not only target the opinions and prejudices that infect the 
human mind. The senses are also addressed: they are taken to be responsible for 
producing a distorted picture of reality, when they are allowed to operate freely. The 
novelty of Bacon's view consists precisely in the double line of attack of his method 
of doubt: on one side, doubt is set against a mind distorted by fallacious opinions and 
prejudices; on the other side, it is meant to recover experience from a mind which 
trusts the judgment of the senses. Bacon develops at the same time a theory on the 
genesis of prejudice and a theory of perceptual error. 
It must be noticed at this point that in recommending his new method Bacon 
describes himself as a 'guide', not as a judge.7 The new method cannot be 
demonstrated, in the same way in which the old method cannot be refuted. 
Demonstrations and refutations belong to that kind of logic (Aristotelian, syllogistic) 
that Bacon intends to challenge.8 Likewise, the new method cannot be accepted from 
the start with a guarantee of certainty. Certainty, Bacon argues, cannot but be the 
result of a philosophical search, and it can never presuppose it - as Aristotelian logic 
would prescribe. The search for certain knowledge develops from a form of 
'suspension of judgment', which, in the final part of The Great Instauration, is 
described in the following terms: 
 
                                                 
7
 'The honour of the ancient authors, and indeed of all, remains untouched; 
since the comparison I challenge is not of wits or faculties, but of ways and 
methods; and the part I take upon myself is not that of a judge, but of a guide.' 
Ibidem, Aph.32; Spedding's ed. p.52. 
 
 
8 'no judgement can be rightly formed either of my method or of the 
discoveries to which it leads, by means of anticipations (that is to say, of the 
reasoning which is now in use); since I cannot be called on to abide by the 
sentence of a tribunal which is itself on its trial.' See Bacon, The New 
Organon, Bk.I, Aph.35; Spedding's ed. p.52. And also: 'for confutations cannot 
be employed, when the difference is upon first principles and very notions and 
even upon forms of demonstrations.' See Bacon, The New Organon, Bk.I, 
Aph.35; Spedding's ed. p.53. 
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"Nor need anyone be alarmed at such suspension of judgment in one who maintains 
not simply that nothing can be known, but only that nothing can be known except in a 
certain course and way; and yet establishes provisionally certain degrees of 
assurance for use and relief until the mind shall arrive at a knowledge of causes in 
which it can rest."9 
 
The suspension of judgment is not empty time. The mind is here incessantly 
confronted by arguments, reasons and operations of various kind, which should 
create the conditions for letting the idea of the new method enter, quietly, those 
minds "that are fit and capable of receiving it."10 
In appealing to this idea of suspension of judgment, Bacon admits that his view 
comes dangerously close to that of traditional scepticism.11 In Aph.67 Bacon reminds 
us of the sceptical doctrine of Acatalepsy (according to which knowledge of anything 
is impossible), introduced by the School of Plato.12 Acatalepsy is not as radical a 
view as the position supported by Pyrro and his followers, who claimed that we 
should suspend judgment in all things, and therefore we should avoid forming and 
maintaining any opinion whatsoever. The supporters of Acatalepsy, Bacon points out, 
only claim that nothing can be known as true: the suspension of judgment does not 
prevent us from holding probable opinions. Bacon appears to be more sympathetic 
towards this latter form of scepticism, although he firmly denies that the analogy with 
his own position goes any further than the initial stages: 
 
"The doctrine of those who have denied that certainty could be attained at all, has 
some agreement with my way of proceeding at the first setting out; but they end in 
being infinitely separated and opposed. For the holders of that doctrine assert simply 
that nothing can be known; I also assert that not much can be known in nature by the 
                                                 
9  Bacon, The Great Instauration, 'Plan of the Work', Spedding's ed. p.32. 
 
10 Bacon, The New Organon, Bk.I, Aph.35. 
 
11 It has been pointed out that Bacon, in his polemics against traditional 
philosophy and science, makes use of Pyrronian arguments. See on this 
Popkin,R., (1960) The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza, who 
on this particular aspect refers to Mersenne,M. (1625), La Verit‚ des Sciences, 
Bk.I, ch.xvi (pp.205-18). 
 
12 Bacon refers here to the third period of Plato's Academy: the so-called 
'New Academy' which started with Carneades of Cyrene, 219-179 B.C. 
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way which is now in use. But then they go on to destroy the authority of the senses 
and understanding; whereas I proceed to devise and supply help for the same."13 
 
It appears that the purpose of Bacon's 'suspension of judgement' is not to destroy the 
authority of either the senses or reason. It is rather to show their epistemological 
limits, and then offer help to both.14 This 'help', as we have just read, cannot come 
from "the way which is now in use": this is how far Bacon's scepticism can go. A 
different 'course', which is offered by the new method, is what is needed to turn 
Bacon's view away from radical scepticism, and move it towards a more constructive 
position: the 'doubting attitude' of the mind, if correctly employed, should lead the 
mind towards certainties, rather than driving it away from them. 
Before analysing the development of this 'doubting attitude' of the mind, it might be 
useful to summarize the features of Baconian doubt that have been identified so far. 
Firstly, Baconian doubt has two functions: one is to attack the old mind, the other to 
defend the new one. In order to make the shift from the old to the new possible, the 
mind must be cleared. In order to be cleared, the mind is to be guided: to possess a 
mind as innocent as that of a child is indeed a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
to pursue true knowledge. A clean mind left on its own will easily go astray, that is it 
will become once again subject to prejudice and opinions. 
The appropriate guide for the mind is to be the new method. However, since the new 
method does not yet exist (it is, at this point, only what Bacon aims to discover), it is 
necessary to collect a number of reasons and of possible merits of the envisaged 
new method, which might justify the use of the latter as a plausible guide. If we find 
reasons to defend the new method, these very reasons give us ground to attack and 
get rid of the old method. So, it can be argued, the defensive function of doubt is a 
necessary condition for launching an attack on the old method. 
Secondly, Baconian doubt has two targets: reason and the senses. The kind of 
reason attacked by the doubt is both that which is subdued to the wrong kinds of 
guide (opinions, prejudices, senses, etc.), and that which is free from any guide. 
Analogously, the senses are challenged both when they appear free to explore – 
                                                 
13 Bacon, The New Organon, Bk.I, Aph.37; Spedding's ed. p.53. 
 
14 As we also read in The Great Instauration: "They [those schools of 
philosophy which held the absolute impossibility of knowing anything] did not 
provide helps for the sense and understanding, as I have done, but simply 
took away all their authority; which is quite a different thing - almost the 
reverse." See Bacon, The Great Instauration, Spedding's ed. p.32. 
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since in this situation they end up producing distorted judgments – and when they let 
a distorted mind to be their guide – since in this case they are presumed to be 
reliable when in fact they are not. 
Finally, Baconian doubt relies on a double-sided strategy. It is negative and 
affirmative at the same time. The sceptical idea of the 'suspension of judgment' is 
used to convey this double-sidedness, by suggesting a basic argument of the 
following form: 
 
nothing can be known    (negative side) 
 
if and only if 
the old course and way are followed  (affirmative side) 
 
The new method finds its first defence in the attempt to overcome a scepticism of a 
conclusive, negative kind, that is that kind of scepticism which Bacon indicates as 
being itself an obstacle or, as we will see shortly, an 'idol' of the mind. In Aph.92 we 
read: 
 
"By far the greatest obstacle to the progress of science and to the undertaking of new 
tasks and provinces therein, is found in this  - that men despair and think things 
impossible."15 
 
 
2. The 'preparatory' work in Book I of The New Organon. 
Bacon emphatically declares that the task he sets himself in the first book of the New 
Organon is "to prepare men's minds as much to understand as to accept what is to 
follow", to bring the mind "into the right position, to give it a favourable aspect (...) 
towards what I am going to put before it". 
The First Book is divided into two parts: a 'pars destruens' (the clearing of the mind 
from idols and false notions) and a 'pars construens' (the offering of positive reasons 
for the acceptance of the new method). 
The destructive part consists of two critiques: the first is a critique of "natural human 
reason", that reason which, once left free to operate, becomes prey of idols, or false 
notions; the second is a critique of what Bacon defines " the strongholds and 
                                                 
15 Bacon, The New Organon, Bk.I, Aph.92; Spedding's ed. p.90. 
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defences of Idols"16, that is vicious demonstrations on one side, and philosophies and 
sciences which make use of those demonstrations on the other.17 
In the constructive part Bacon suggests a number of reasons, which are aimed at 
building up a defence of the new method. They are presented in such a way that they 
appear to follow from the results gained from the destructive part: once falsehood 
and error are removed, the mind can then start considering the legitimacy of a 
change of method. The 'defence' of the new method is also therefore a cure or 
remedy: that is, a strategy for overcoming the 'suspension of judgment'.18 
 
2.1 The destructive part: the critique of Idols. 
The discussion of the Idols appears almost at the beginning of Book I of the New 
Organon (from Aph.39 to Aph.68). Before analysing in what sense the notion of 
doubt is central to this discussion, it might be useful to review some interpretations of 
the meaning of the term 'idol' in Bacon's work. 
Why did Bacon choose the word 'idol' to represent the category of false opinions, 
prejudices, and the like? Paolo Rossi agrees with Ellis' interpretation, according to 
which 'idolum' literally means 'phantom', or 'spectrum', that is illusion or false 
appearance. Bacon surely derives the term from Plato's Republic: in the myth of the 
cave, as is well known, Plato describes the shadows (eidola) that are mistaken for 
real figures.19 
However, Rossi also urges us not to neglect another crucial meaning of the term, 
namely the biblical one. For example, by recalling Withney, when Bacon accuses 
Plato of "grovelling on his own blind and confused idols”, he appears to refer to idols 
as if they were a sort of "misguided worship".20 Besides, Bacon often compares the 
                                                 
16 Bacon, The New Organon, Bk.I, Aph.69, Spedding's ed. p.70. 
 
17 Demonstrations are said to be 'vicious' since they are affected by an 
erroneous use of sense impressions, taken to be reliable as such, and then 
used in the deduction of first principles. In what follows I will not concern 
myself with a discussion of this critique of the destructive part. 
 
18 It must be observed that the reasons in favour of the new method, though 
presented as a consequence of the critiques which constitute the destructive 
part, are in fact what guides us towards the criticism itself. So, in a sense 
which will become apparent below, the constructive part is implicitly present in 
the destructive part, and used by the latter as a tool for criticism and guide 
towards it. 
 
19 Paolo Rossi, Francis Bacon, pp.161-63. 
 
20 Withney, Francis Bacon and Modernity, p.38. 
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abandonment of idols to the state of purity and innocence required in order to enter 
the world of Heaven. This sounds akin to Jeremy's attack on false prophets, who 
"speak a vision out of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord."21 This 
would also explain the distinction suggested by Bacon between human 'idols' and 
divine 'ideas': 
 
"There is a great difference between the Idols of the human mind and the Ideas of 
the divine. That is to say, between certain empty dogmas, and the true signatures 
and marks set upon the works of creation as they are found in nature."22 
 
Common to the various meaning and interpretations is nonetheless the feature that 
'idola' are 'misleading guides' for the mind, and as such they are to be removed. 
In the New Organon, the Idols are categorized in four groups, of which I will only give 
a cursory description. The first category consists of the Idols of the Tribe: these are 
rooted in the human nature, and in the tribe or race of mankind. Human nature is like 
a distorting mirror, which, says Bacon, 
 
"receiving rays irregularly, distorts and discolors the nature of things by mingling its 
own nature with it."23 
                                                                                                                                            
 
21 Jeremy, 23:16. 
22  Bacon, The New Organon, Bk.I, Aph.23; Spedding's ed. p.51. It has also 
been pointed out how the way in which Bacon identifies the idols of the mind 
has influenced the concept of 'ideology' proper of the Enlightment, in 
particular the way in which this concept was usd to label those intellectual 
systems which served the interests of a group rather than serving truth per se. 
See for ex., Barth,H., Truth and Ideology (1976), Berkeley: University of 
California Press, pp.22-26. 
 
23 Bacon, The New Organon, Bk.I, Aph.41; Spedding's ed. p.54. Bacon offers 
examples of these 'distortions'. In Aph. 45 he says that the human mind is for 
its own nature inclined "to suppose the existence of more order and regularity 
in the world than it finds." This attitude is then responsible for the production 
of dogmas, fiction, and philosophical dreams. In Aph. 46, Bacon points out 
how the human mind, once it adopts a certain opinion "draws all things else to 
support and agree with it", which is the easiest route towards superstition. 
Imagination, the will and its passions, and the senses are also listed as being 
responsible for the emergence and proliferation of prejudice. The imagination 
is more easily seduced by things which "strike the mind simultaneously and 
suddenly" rather than letting themselves being searched upon slowly, and 
with patience (Aph.47). The will and its passions push us to believe as true 
what mostly pleases us (Aph.49) The senses are "infirm and erring" when left 
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The second are the Idols of the Cave, that originate from the nature of particular 
individuals and therefore depend on his or her education, habits, and circumstances 
of their growth (readings, admired authorities, and the various impressions which 
mark the mind).24 
The third are the Idols of the Market, that relate to "the intercourse and association of 
men with each other".25 In particular, they derive from what is considered the 
essential tool for commerce and social exchange: language. Words, Bacon claims, 
are normally used according to vulgar understanding, and for this reason they are 
often responsible for misunderstanding and error in communication.26 
Finally, the Idols of the Theatre are those that penetrate the human mind via the 
various dogmas of traditional philosophy and the erroneous laws of demonstrations. 
Philosophical systems are like plays: they invent stories for the 'philosophical stage', 
that is stories which are "more compact and elegant, and more as one would wish 
them to be, than true stories out of history."27 Philosophical systems, then, produce 
worlds of fiction, scenographies or dreams of reality. 
In the process of describing the Idols, it is interesting to note that Bacon also 
suggests a further categorization that ‘cuts across’ the four categories. Idols, Bacon 
                                                                                                                                            
without an appropriate guide, and this explains their "dullness, incompetency, 
and deceptions" (Aph.50). See Bacon, The New Organon, Bk.I, Spedding's 
ed. pp.56-57. 
 
24 It must be noted that Bacon is here offering a theory on the genesis of 
prejudice and perceptual error. See Musgrave 
 
25 See Bacon, The New Organon, Bk.I, Aph.53, and 55; Spedding's ed. p.59. 
 Ibidem, Aph.43; Spedding's ed. p.54. 
 
26 The idols imposed by language are, according to him, of two main kinds: 
either words name things which do not exist (and as such they result in the 
construction of false theories), or they name things, which exists but they do 
so in a confused and abstract manner. In the latter case, the problem is yet 
more complex, since in the attempt to correct confusion and abstraction we 
use common language, which we have identified as being the very source of 
confusion and abstraction. See Bacon, The New Organon, Bk.I, Aph.60; 
Spedding's ed. p.61. 
 
27  'And in the plays of this philosophical theatre you may observe the same 
thing which is found in the theatre of the poets, that stories invented for the 
stage are more compact and elegant, and more as one would wich them to 
be, than true stories out of history.' Bacon, The New Organon, Bk.I, Aph.62; 
Spedding's ed. p.63. 
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claims, can be either ‘innate’ or ‘acquired’. This distinction is not set out in the first 
book of the New Organon, as it has already appeared in the ‘Great Instauration’: 
 
"the idols, or phantoms, by which the mind is occupied are either adventitious or 
innate. The adventitious come into the mind from without - namely, either from the 
doctrines and sects of philosophers or from perverse rules of demonstration. But the 
innate are inherent in the very nature of the intellect, which is far more prone to error 
than the sense is."28 
 
Only the Idols of the Theatre are listed among the acquired one and as such they are 
considered to be, though with difficulty, eliminable. The other three classes of Idols 
are instead viewed as constitutive of the human mind, and by being so they can 
never be completely removed from it. Therefore, all we can do, proceeds Bacon, is 
 
"to point them out, so that this insidious action of the mind may be marked and 
reproved (else as fast as old errors are destroyed new ones will spring up out of the 
ill complexion of the mind itself, and so we shall have but a change of errors, and not 
a clearance)."29 
 
The point of interest in this further classification of the Idols is that Bacon, by 
acknowledging the constitutive nature of most categories of idols, seems to surrender 
to a negative conclusion: if at least some idols cannot be removed from the human 
mind, true knowledge is an unattainable aim. The 'clean and innocent mind' which 
can be guided towards truth is only and yet another dream. 
However, this is not the kind of conclusion that Bacon is prepared to subscribe to: his 
'constructive scepticism' drives him in a different direction. The distinction between 
innate and acquired idols is, I believe, to be interpreted in the following manner. The 
theory of the Idols is a sort of phenomenological description of the genesis of error 
and prejudice. The function of this theory is not that of eradicating both error and 
prejudice. Bacon is aware of the fact that the 'cleaning operation' of the mind is more 
a regulative ideal than a concrete and attainable end. Instead, the function of the 
theory consists in pointing at the difference between two kinds of mind: a 'corrupted' 
mind vs. a 'renewed' one. 
                                                 
28 The Great Instauration, 'The Plan of the Work', Spedding's ed. p.27. 
 
29
 Idem. 
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A corrupted mind is passive, dogmatic, subject to opinion and unable to identify 
errors in any adequate manner. A renewed mind is critical, sceptical of opinions 
mistaken for truths and well equipped to recognize errors, their genesis and their 
dangers. A renewed mind is a mind capable to doubt (capable to make use of the 
doubt in a constructive and critical manner). 
Bacon's doubt, according to this interpretation, appears then to be not only as a 
preparatory tool for knowledge, to be used in the preliminary stage of inquiry that 
precedes the actual search for true knowledge but to be then rid of once the mind 
has been appropriately prepared to undertake this search. It appears instead to be 
an essential condition for the search itself, as it defines the essential feature of the 
type of mind needed in that search.  
I mentioned earlier that Baconian doubt is methodical in two senses: Bacon, I 
claimed, prescribes the doubt as a cure, and the cure itself leads to the new method. 
In the light of what has just been argued, we can now better understand what this 
double meaning of 'being methodical' amounts to in epistemological terms: Baconian 
doubt prescribes the correct 'route' towards knowledge (replacing the old method 
with the new), and it describes what the appropriate use of the mind is in order follow 
this route (replacing a dogmatic mind with a critical 'doubting' one). 
 
2.2. Defending the new method: the 'arguments of hope'. 
Having discussed the general structure and function of Bacon's methodical doubt, we 
can now see how this doubt is put to work – that is, we can show how the kind of 
critical mind that the method of doubt has identified and made possible plays its role 
in the constructive part of Book I. 
In Aphorism 97 we read: 
 
"if any one of the ripe age, unimpared senses, and well-purged mind, apply himself 
anew to experience and particulars, better hopes may be entertained of that man." 
 
From here onwards, Bacon begins a more direct and explicit defence of his new 
method. This is achieved by presenting the merits of the new conception and 
assessing their value on the basis of their success in correcting the vices and errors 
inherited from tradition. The 'better hopes' Bacon refers to in the passage above are 
not simply an article of faith. They rightly belong in the preparatory work, as clarified 
in Aphorism 92: 
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"I am not a dealer in promises, and wish neither to force nor to ensnare men's 
judgments, but to lead them by the hand with their good will." 
 
Hope is to be the object of "conjectures" which make it "reasonable".30 Hope is, 
therefore, for Bacon, the desired effect of a way of arguing, meaning a tool provided 
by a renewed or critical mind. In the remaining of this section a sampling of 
'arguments of hope' will be presented and discussed, in order to exemplify the kind of 
work made possible and achieved by a mind instructed by Bacon’s methodical doubt. 
Of each argument I will describe its structure and its argumentative strategy.31 
Among the causes of the ill state of philosophical inquiry Bacon includes the lack of 
hope in the achievements of the sciences. One of the arguments he puts forward to 
persuade his audience that such despair is ungrounded appears in Aph.108: 
 
"if many useful discoveries have been made by accident or upon occasion, when 
men were not seeking for them  but were busy about other things; non one can doubt 
but that when they apply themselves to seek and make this their business, and that 
too by method and in order and not by desultory impulses, they will discover far 
more." 
 
Structure of the argument: if chance can produce discoveries, and method is better 
than chance (because it can make as many discoveries as chance, but in a 
controlled manner), then method is to be favoured. 
 
Argumentative strategy: we are prompted to compare chance and method, and 
forced to admit (= led to believe) that method is better. 
 
Among the causes of the ill state of philosophy Bacon also lists the veneration for 
antiquity. In Aph.84 he tries to show that such veneration is wrong: 
                                                 
30  'And therefore it is fit that I publish and set forth those conjectures of mine 
which make hope in this matter reasonable.' Bacon, The New Organon, Bk.I, 
Aph.92; Spedding's ed. p.91. 
 
31 For a discussion of the 'arguments of hope' see also Montuschi, E., 'Non-
methodological Aspects of Scientific Method', Proceedings of the International 
Advanced Research Workshop on 'Mind, Reality and Values', The Open 
Society Fund, Sofia 1997. 
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"And truly as we look for greater knowledge of human things and a riper judgment in 
the old man than in the young, so in like manner from our age (...) much more might 
fairly be expected than from the ancient times, inasmuch as it is a more advanced 
age of the world, and stored and stocked with infinite experiments and observations." 
 
Structure of the argument: old is better than young; we are older than the ancients 
(we come after them); therefore we are better. 
 
Argumentative strategy: Truth is the daughter of time, not of Authority. 
 
In Aphorism 94 "a consideration of the greatest importance as an argument of hope" 
can be derived from past error and already trodden paths. In drawing an analogy 
from a government administered without wisdom, Bacon writes: 
 
"if during so long a course of years men had kept the true road for discovering and 
cultivating sciences, and yet been unable to make further progress therein, bold 
doubtless and rash would be the opinion that further progress is possible. But if the 
road itself has been mistaken, and men's labour spent on unfit objects, it follows that 
the difficulty has its rise not in things themselves, (...), but in the human 
understanding, and the use and application thereof, which admist of remedy and 
medicine." 
 
Structure of argument: course A has a certain aim a (progress and new discoveries). 
If A does not result in a, it means that there are difficulties either with the object a (the 
'things' to be discovered) or with the subject (the human mind) who follows A. If it is 
the subject's fault (as Bacon seems to suggest later), then the subject is to be cured. 
 
Argumentative strategy: an undesired result prompts us to look for its cause; once 
the cause is found, it is asked how this cause can be removed in order to remove the 
undesired result. The elimination of the cause is possible only if a different course is 
followed. If the different course removes the cause and then eliminates the undesired 
result, then it becomes 'reasonable' to hope in this different course. 
 
The 'cause' in question rests on the fact that all the sciences, up until Bacon’s time, 
had been dealing with one of the following two categories of individuals: the men of 
experiment and the men of dogma. The former are like ants: "they only collect and 
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use". The latter are like spiders: "they make cobwebs out of their own substance".32 
Why not trying to put together the merits of each category of individuals and promote 
a 'middle way', Bacon suggests? The true philosophy would appear, then, to adopt 
the course of a bee. A bee "gathers its material from the flowers of the garden and of 
the field" (i.e., the equivalent of collecting natural histories and mechanical 
experiments), "but transforms and digests it by a power of its own" (i.e., the 
equivalent of the rational and critical power of the mind). 
The behaviour of a bee is to be the model for the new course. 
 
Another 'argument of hope' is presented in Aphorism 109: 
 
"Another argument of hope may be drawn from this - that some of the inventions 
already known are such as before they were discovered it could hardly have entered 
any man's head to think of; they would have been simply set aside as impossible." 
 
We seem then entitled to hope that there might be many more discoveries and 
inventions kept hidden by nature, which are incomparable with anything already 
existing, and "lying entirely out of the beat of the imagination."33 
So far this does not appear properly as an 'argument' in favour of Bacon's new 
method. Bacon then proceeds by providing a supporting reason, as found in 
Aph.110: 
 
"there is a great mass of inventions still remaining which not only by means of 
operations that are yet to be discovered, but also through the transferring, 
comparing, and applying of those already known, by the help of the learned 
experience (...), may be deduced and brought to light.” 
 
In other words, the new method, by making use of 'learned experience', that is 
experience guided by a just rule, will be able to tell the mind where and how to find 
the common 'intellectual' principle behind all inventions, past present and future. 
 
Structure of the argument: first stage - some inventions I have been brought into 
light. I were unimaginable before their appearance. Therefore, what cannot be 
                                                 
32 Ibidem, Aph.95; Spedding's ed. p.93. 
 
33 Ibidem, Aph.109; Spedding's ed. p.100. 
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imagined today might as well become existent tomorrow. Second stage - the course 
which brought about I cannot account for the relation between firstly, the existence of 
the present inventions and their imagination, and secondly, their existence and the 
imagination of future inventions. The missing link is provided by the new method, 
meaning the method that makes use of 'learned experience'. 
 
Argumentative strategy: once established the importance of present inventions, their 
condition of possibility and their power as exemplar, then it is suggested that both 
aspects of importance can be explained only by the use of the new method. 
 
My final example of an 'argument of hope' is taken from Aph.114. Here Bacon tries to 
convey the belief that an attempt to act upon despair is still the best option: 
 
"For there is no comparison between that which we may lose by not trying and by not 
succeeding; since by not trying we throw away the chance of an immense good; by 
not succeeding we only incur the loss of a little human labour." 
 
Structure of the argument: pursuing X might produce the loss of a little x refraining 
from X might preclude the possibility of a big y; it is worth taking the plunge. 
 
Argumentative strategy: a disparity is envisaged between a negligible present loss 
and a possible substantial future gain. Since it is known that the present loss is little, 
anything which we might gain as a result of our trying is still preferable. 
 
Aph.129 provides further support to the same argument: 
"if the usefulness of just one particular invention has so impressed men that they 
deemed superhuman the man who could secure the devotion of the entire human 
race through some benefit he brought, how much loftier will it seem to discover 
something that will enable all other discoveries to be readily made?" 
 
Structure of the argument: if A has the effect a, X  - which allows for A plus B,C,D, ... 
K -  will have an effect aK. 
 
Argumentative strategy: X is more powerful than A, because we can resort to X to 
produce A, but not viceversa. Therefore the philosophy which allows and promotes 
new discoveries is the one to be favoured. 
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3. A doubting mind for a better method: Bacon's anti-sceptical conclusions. 
Once 'hope' in the new method has been given good arguments to rely on, the 
course of Bacon's doubt appears completed. It started by preparing the mind for the 
acceptance of this method: obstacles to true knowledge were identified and 
classified, and their dangers exposed. It then proceeded to persuade a well alerted 
mind that these obstacles are to set aside, or at least kept under strict control, in 
order for the mind to accept a new guide. In following this procedure, Bacon can 
argue in favour of the possibility of true knowledge, and against the negative 
conclusions of the radical sceptic. 
Finally, in exercising its function, Baconian doubt identifies a new type of mind, or 
better, a new purpose and use for it. Our mind, as Bacon shows us, does not receive 
truth by intuition (as in the Aristotelian model). It must look for it instead. Truth, which 
becomes the sought-after result of an inquiry rather that being its premise, is looked 
upon as an object of conquest on the part of an inquiring mind.  
There is no room for doubt in a demonstration. There is no task or function that doubt 
can display in a syllogism. Doubt belongs to that form of reasoning where a subject is 
able to challenge his or her beliefs, by challenging at the same time his or her 
epistemological tools of inquiry. 
This, as we have seen, does not mean that the more we feel entitled to doubt the 
more we distance ourselves from knowledge (as traditional sceptics would have it). It 
means instead, at least in Bacon, that adopting a logic of discovery of truth is ipso 
facto adopting it critically, in a modern sense: by showing us how methodical doubt 
can be used, Bacon gave us a tool to imagine – as well as to justifiably hope – that 
attaining knowledge is indeed a possible task. 
 
 
 
